




I n a well-known journal entry from 1854 Kierkegaard made the following suggestive alignment between imagination and 
women:
Imagination is what providence uses to take men captive in 
actuality, in existence, in order to get them far enough out, 
or within, or down into actuality. And when imagination 
has helped them get as far out as they should be - then 
actuality genuinely begins.
Johannes V. Muller says that there are two great powers 
around which all revolves: ideas and women. This is entire­
ly correct and is consistent with what I say here about the 
significance of imagination. Women or ideas are what 
beckon men out into existence.1
In what follows I will argue that there are two different 
levels of appreciation of the feminine within this alignment of 
imagination with the feminine. These levels of appreciation 
constitute first, a simple but insufficient response to a feminist 
ethical critique and second, a deeper, more sophisticated 
response. I will initially consider how two of his pseudonymous 
works illustrate and explain the very positive assessment of 
imagination which is expressed in the above journal entry, and 
hence support a correspondingly positive evaluation of the 
feminine. I will then suggest in Sections 2 and 3 how that posi­
tive evaluation of imagination and the feminine might neverthe­
less be one with which a feminist ethical theorist could be dis­
satisfied - that is, since it is the character of the use of imagina­
tion (not its indispensability) which determines whether a given 
ethic is congenial to feminist concerns, Kierkegaard’s emphasis 
on ethical imagination does not automatically save him from
feminist criticism. Finally, by showing in Section 4 how this femi­
nist ethical dissatisfaction is not necessarily warranted, I will be 
introducing the second level of appreciation of the feminine 
found in these accounts. The feminist critique will itself indirect­
ly highlight the way in which a Kierkegaardian ethic can be con­
genial to feminist concerns.
Despite the fact that imagination is often spoken of in the 
Kierkegaardian corpus in very negative or derogatory ways (he 
condemns wandering in what he terms the “fairyland of imagi­
nation,” and warns that imagination can take us so “far out” that 
we lose ourselves2), in at least two of the pseudonymous works 
- those by Judge William and Johannes Climacus - the role of 
imagination in ethical (or self) development is clearly the posi­
tive role expressed in the journal entry noted at the outset. I 
will consider these accounts in turn, indicating how they reveal 
the value and indispensability of imagination. This understand­
ing of ethical imagination, when correlated with the feminine, 
provides support for the first level of appreciation of the femi­
nine and hence for the first level of response to a feminist chal­
lenge.
Judge William’s account of the ethical in Either-Or includes 
the following crucial elements. The hallmark of the ethical is 
“choice,” and in choice a person “becomes himself, quite the 
same self he was before, down to the least significant peculiari­
ty, and yet he becomes another.”3 Moreover, “he who chooses 
himself ethically has himself as his task, and not as a possibility 
merely, not as a toy to be played with arbitrarily.”4 Although 
this task of “becoming” oneself-and-yet-another does not involve 
“possibility merely,” it does nonetheless involve possibility (and 
hence, imagination), for he writes:
The self which the individual knows is at once the actual 
self and the ideal self which the individual has outside him­
self as the picture in likeness to which he has to form him­
self, and which, on the other hand, he nevertheless has in 
him since it is the self.5
The “ideal self” is a possibility; ethical development re­
quires the appropriation of the possible - i.e., it requires an 
“imagination of otherness.”6 The ideal or possible self is the 
“other” one becomes while becoming oneself, and likening one­
self to that “picture” is what constitutes ethical development.
The self one becomes is “himself ... yet ... absolutely distinct 
from his former self.”7 Since only imagination can give us access 
to such a possible self and since only imagination can achieve 
the requisite holding of actual and ideal self together in simul­
taneous tension, the importance of ethical imagination in such 
an account is clear.
Climacus’s account of subjectivity in the Concluding Un­
scientific Postscript carries on many of these same themes. For 
example, Climacus puts imagination on a par with thought and 
feeling, rejecting a hierarchy. “In existence,” he writes, “thought 
is by no means higher them imagination and feeling, but coordi­
nate”; our task is “not to exalt the one at the expense of the 
other, but to give them an equal status, to unify them in simulta­
neity.”8 Moreover, Climacus reinforces Judge William’s charac­
terization of ethical development as centrally involving imagina­
tion. The “ethical demand,” he explains, “is that he become infi­
nitely interested in existing,”9 and that means remaining within 
the “tremendous contradiction” which “existence involves,” 
understanding “the greatest oppositions together.”10 Affirming 
“oppositions together” - holding opposites in tension - is a 
distinctive function of imagination. Likewise, Climacus claims 
that genuine selfhood requires maintaining a tension between 
infinite and finite which is achievable only through imaginative 
activity - it is through what he terms an “imaginative represen­
tation” that we are rendered infinite, and only imagination can 
maintain that infinity in irreducible tension with our finitude.11 
Thus, the indispensability of imagination to the task of subjecti­
vity and the ethical is similarly affirmed in both accounts.12
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One might ask at this point, however, how much scope for genuine “otherness” is really implied in these accounts of 
ethical imagination. The question whether there is a genuine 
“other” can be raised in two forms (or from two directions). The 
first form concerns the separate or social other, and is raised by 
those who fear the Kierkegaardian ethic is solitary and individu­
alistic, failing to do justice to concerns about community, soli­
darity, and relationship. This criticism (one not limited to femi­
nists) is that the imagination of “otherness” in his works seems 
limited to the solitary self in its ideal representation. In support
of such a charge, one could point, for example, to Judge Wil­
liam’s claim that the ethical individual “has himself as a task ... 
the aim of his activity is himself.”13 Such an imagination of 
“otherness” does not seem to go beyond a solitary self-fulfill­
ment ethic.
Such a criticism ignores the way in which ethical imagina­
tion in these accounts is bound to the notion of a concrete 
agent, bound in such a way as to preclude a prescriptive indivi­
dualistic insulation. 1 shall argue that a limitation of the “other” 
to the ideal self is precluded because both Judge William and 
Climacus wholeheartedly and repeatedly affirm the concrete­
ness of the ethical agent, and insofar as they do this they affirm 
not only the agent’s particularity and specificity and unique­
ness, but also its embeddedness in a context of relations.
The development of self which is described by Judge Wil­
liam is not a formal matter - the self is “not conscious simply of 
freedom in general,”14 but of freedom realized in relatedness. 
The ethical is unpacked in terms of seeing “tasks everywhere.”15 
This implies a contextual web of social relations and demands; 
this implication is borne out in Judge William’s claim that “one 
can choose oneself ethically only by repenting oneself,” and 
such “repentance puts the individual in the most intimate con­
nection and the most exact cohesion with a surrounding 
world.”16 The concreteness of the self inevitably implies relation 
to other selves beyond the self, for they are part of the “mani­
fold variety of determinants” which determine the self as con­
crete.17 An imaginative extension to a genuinely separate other 
is in this way built into a genuine acknowledgement of the 
agent’s concreteness.
This is also made explicit by Judge William as he details 
what is implied in maintaining “continuity with the finite.”18 
References to the “deep and heartfelt sense of community” at 
the bottom of family life and the sense of “responsibility” which 
distinguishes the ethical from the aesthetic, to remaining among 
people, to going out of oneself, to uniting oneself with mankind, 
and the importance of all those to whom one is “bound by obli­
gations and with whom he might have come into relationship”: 
all of these references render explicit the sociality implied in 
concrete agency.19 Thus, an emphasis on contextuality implies 
an affirmation of solidarity and community. The concrete self is 
necessarily a related self, a self in relation to other selves. Just 
as the ideal self calls me, is seen as a demand, so too the other-
beyond-the-self calls me, places a demand - or more precisely, 
the demands are co-extensive.
Such an ethic of relatedness, however, insures only that 
there be an appreciation of a genuinely separate other - a mini­
mum recognition of duty and obligation. The demands of such 
an ethic can in principle be met within the rubric of a very for­
mal understanding of the other as an abstract, universalized 
other. A second form of criticism of an ethical orientation can 
be raised, therefore, which takes for granted that ethical attenti­
on is oriented toward the other-beyond-the-self, but questions 
the way in which that other is addressed. The question is not 
about genuinely separate others, but about concrete others. The 
question no longer concerns solitariness, but, rather, abstrac­
tion - and the possibility of this kind of criticism of ethical 
orientations in general has been most strongly put forth by 
proponents of feminist ethics.
I turn now to a brief consideration of one contemporary 
account of such a feminist criticism. I will be arguing that this 
formulation of the criticism indirectly turns our attention to the 
Kierkegaardian commitment to concreteness which provides 
resources for a defense against the criticism - that is, the impli­
cations of “concrete” agency which I used to answer the charge 
of the solitariness of the Kierkegaardian ethic (and the limita­
tion of the “other” to the ideal representation of the self) can 
also address this second kind of criticism.
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Seyla Benhabib expresses a central feminist concern in her discussion of two concepts of self-other relations, two per­
spectives on the “other” which inform contrasting moral orien­
tations: namely, an orientation toward the “generalized other” 
and an orientation toward the “concrete other.”20 The former, 
she argues, represents the dominant Kantian-based moral tradi­
tion, and the latter represents a feminist challenge to that tradi­
tion. I will argue in what follows that her delineation of these 
two orientations indirectly serves to illustrate two contrasting 
views of the role of ethical imagination, and hence indirectly 
reveals how a positive valuation of ethical imagination does not 
in itself necessarily guarantee an adequate valuation of the femi­
nine.
The Kierkegaardian emphasis I have noted on the impor­
tance of imagination for ethical development and its correlation 
with the feminine might seem unquestionably welcome to femi­
nist theorists or those advocating a feminist ethics. The align­
ment he makes is without doubt a positive one from his own 
standpoint - the question is whether it is positive only at the 
expense of ignoring or denying what many today would argue is 
central to many feminist self-understandings. Someone might 
affirm the value of the feminine or woman while nevertheless 
misunderstanding or misrepresenting it - that is, depending on 
the way in which imagination is directed to the “other,” an align­
ment between imagination and the feminine might, even if put 
forth as positive, imply an understanding of the feminine which 
feminist theorists would nevertheless want to reject as ignoring 
what is characteristic of feminist concerns. This is possible 
because a positive valuation of ethical imagination is underde­
termined - the role of ethical imagination is open to two quite 
different readings, and one of these is at odds with a central 
concern of feminist theories of ethics. By bringing this possibili­
ty to our attention, Benhabib’s account allows us to focus on a 
second and more important way in which Kierkegaard’s appre­
ciation of the feminine is expressed in his understanding of ethi­
cal imagination.
Benhabib argues that the tradition of “universalistic, con­
tractarian theories from Hobbes to Rawls” illustrates the per­
spective of the “generalized other” because it views the moral 
self as a “disembedded and disembodied being.”21 Relation to the 
other, in this perspective, is “governed by the norms of formal 
equality and reciprocity,” and informed by categories of right, 
duty, and entitlement, whereas the perspective of the “concrete 
other,” by contrast, is “governed by the norms of equity and 
complementary reciprocity,” and informed by categories of 
responsibility, need, and sharing. In the perspective of the 
“generalized other” we abstract from individuality and address 
“humanity”', in the perspective of the “concrete other” we 
abstract from commonality and address “human individuality.”22
Attention to the “other” as a concrete other, rather than a 
merely generalized, abstracted, other is characteristic of that 
moral orientation which was highlighted by Carol Gilligan as 
representing a “different voice” in accounts of moral judgment: 
the orientation of care and responsibility, in contrast to the ori­
entation of justice and rights.23 Although in her samples she
found such an orientation to be “by no means characteristic of 
all women, it was almost exclusively a female phenomenon.”24 
The tradition of Kantian universalistic moral theories, Benhabib 
insists, reveals, on the contrary, a “male” perspective of the 
“generalized other” because such theories are “substitutiona- 
list” in their emphases on universalizability and reversibility; 
they effectively require that “we abstract from the individuality 
and concrete identity of the other.”25 A striking example of this 
is found, she argues, in the Kantian views of moral judgment put 
forth by Kohlberg and Rawls, since both assume that mature 
and just moral judgments can only be made by reference to 
what Rawls calls a “veil of ignorance” in which we make irrele­
vant any knowledge we could have of particular identities. The 
result in both cases is that “the defensible kernel of the ideas of 
reciprocity and fairness are [sic] thereby identified with the per­
spective of the disembedded and disembodied generalized 
other.”26
Benhabib notes that such an undersanding of the ethical 
emphasizes the importance of (in Kohlberg’s words) “taking the 
viewpoint of the others,” and she questions whether such an 
emphasis “is truly compatible with this notion of fairness as rea­
soning behind a “veil of ignorance”.” She suggests that there is 
an “epistemic incoherence” in such theories:
The problem can be stated as follows: according to Kolh- 
berg and Rawls, moral reciprocity involves the capacity to 
take the standpoint of the other, to put oneself imaginative­
ly in the place of the other, but under conditions of the 
“veil of ignorance,” the other as different from the self disap­
pears.27
Although Rawls’s account is not strictly speaking subject to 
Benhabib’s charge that it is “substitutionalist,” and although it 
does not, as Kohlberg’s does, speak of taking the viewpoint of 
the other, it does in the end remain one which, like Kohlberg’s, 
requires that the self and other must be generalized abstrac­
tions - for both, “the other as different from the self disap­
pears.”28 Both we and the other are prescriptively seen in “total 
abstraction” from our/his/her identity. On such an account, 
attention to the particular concreteness of the other is thought 
to obscure moral judgment or taint moral assessments. What 
such an account is blind to, Benhabib suggests, is that when
reference to and relevance of “how I, as a finite, concrete, embo­
died individual, shape and fashion the circumstances of my 
birth and family, linguistic, cultural, and gender identity into a 
coherent narrative” is precluded, there can no longer be “indivi­
duated” selves or others.29 Under such conditions of blindness 
to the concrete (the embedded, the embodied) there can no 
longer be individuated moral situations either.30 To sum up, 
Benhabib argues that
a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of 
the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot indi­
viduate among selves. Without assuming the standpoint of 
the concrete other, no coherent universalizability test can 
be carried out, for we lack the necessary epistemic infor­
mation to judge my moral situation to be “like” or “unlike” 
yours.31
The alternative to such a limiting view of interchangeable 
reciprocity or identification is one which “acknowledges that 
every generalized other is also a concrete other.”32 An under­
standing of ethical imagination as directed toward an apprecia­
tion of the concrete other rather than the generalized other 
would then be an understanding of ethical imagination entirely 
congenial to feminist ethical theory. Such a view of ethical ima­
gination both would be understandably aligned with the femini­
ne and would, on feminist terms, appropriately value the femini­
ne. The question is whether Kierkegaard’s alignment of the femi­
nine with ethical imagination expresses and underlines a chal­
lenge to a traditional (Kantian) view of ethical imagination, with 
its emphasis on an atomistic, individualistic model of an auton­
omous self in relation to abstract, universalizable others - or 
whether instead it values the feminine only by assimilating it to 
the traditional (masculine) model.
What I find most interesting about Benhabib’s account of 
the orientation to the “generalized other” is that, although she 
focusses on the “incoherence” of a position which acknowled­
ges the role of the imaginative activity of taking the viewpoint of 
others at the same time as it is prescriptively blind to individual 
identity, her account indirectly reveals that there are two very 
different ways in which ethical imagination can function. Both 
orientations (toward the generalized other and toward the con­
crete other) involve a concern with the “other” and to that
extent both centrally involve imaginative activity. This is so 
because only imagination can effect the required extension - 
whether the extension is one of abstraction or of concretizing. 
But, although the orientation toward the “generalized other” 
emphasizes ethical imagination, it does so in a truncated way, 
for it emphasizes one function of imagination at the expense of 
other functions - it emphasizes the imaginative activity of 
abstraction to the exclusion of the imaginative activity of 
making concrete. It is, ironically, the use of imagination to limit 
imagination. The result is that the paradigm of the ethical 
becomes what Benhabib calls the “silent thought process of a 
single self who imaginatively puts himself in the position of the 
other,”33 but the “other” it posits is seen in abstraction from 
anything that could identify and individuate her or him.
To put the matter concisely, since imagination is integral to 
both perspectives on the “other” - generalized and concrete - 
an emphasis on ethical imagination does not as such guarantee 
that a given moral theory is congenial with or supportive of 
feminist moral orientations. Thus, an alignment between imagi­
nation and the feminine (such as we saw Kierkegaard affirm) 
does not guarantee that imagination will be understood in ways 
that feminist ethics will find adequate. The understanding of 
imagination as abstracting and generalizing reinforces traditio­
nal concepts of ethical obligation and autonomy, while the 
understanding of imagination as concretizing is more congenial 
to a feminist challenge to that tradition. The question is whe­
ther Kierkegaard’s view of ethical imagination is one which in 
fact supports the orientation towards the concrete other, or, 
instead, follows the dominant tradition in its emphasis on the 
“universal” and hence expresses an ethic of relationship, but 
only in terms of substitutability, reversible reciprocity, or effec­
tive identification. The answer to that question will reveal what 
understanding of the feminine lies behind his alignment of imagi­
nation and the feminine.
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The emphasis on the universal in various Kierkegaardian accounts of the ethical calls to mind just that universalistic 
moral theorizing (whether of the Kantian or Rawlsian variety) 
which a feminist ethic challenges. Indeed, in Fear and Trembling,
for example, the understanding of the ethical as the “universal” 
seems a straightforwardly Kantian one, premised on the irrele­
vance of particulars and exceptions - a lack which is only made 
up in the religious realm. In what follows I will briefly explore 
the understanding of the “universal” found in the two pseudo­
nymous works I have been considering to see whether through 
his emphasis on the “universal,” ethical imagination is really 
directed to a “generalized other”.
Some texts which appear to provide grist for the feminist 
ethical mill can be found in Judge William’s account. He repeat­
edly affirms that “the ethical is the universal and so it is the 
abstract,” and claims that “the task which the ethical individual 
sets himself is to transform himself into the universal man.”34 
Although we have seen that Judge William’s ethic is clearly not 
a solitary one, such texts might suggest that ethical relation­
ships are paradigmatically universalizable and hence abstract. I 
suggest, on the contrary, that in Judge William’s account the 
contextualizing of the agent which expresses the concreteness 
of the self and is constituted by social relationships can be 
extended to include the concreteness of other agents - the con­
crete other constitutes a deeper contextualization of the con­
crete self. This can be shown in a variety of ways.
First, the orientation to a concrete other is implied in the 
two-fold way in which Judge William relates the ethical to the 
aesthetic, for both aspects of that relation emphasize concrete­
ness and particularity as distinctive of the ethical. One expres­
sion of the relation between the ethical and the aesthetic is in 
terms of Judge William’s rejection of the superficiality of the 
aesthete: his flitting around in possibilities, his “hovering” above 
himself,35 his failure, in other words, to be deep “down into 
actuality” and existence. This, repeatedly illustrated by Judge 
William’s rejection of the aesthetic stance of the “observer,”36 is 
conversely an affirmation of relationships to concrete others. 
The entire book can be seen as a set of variations on the theme 
that the limit of the aesthetic is that for the aesthete things 
come to pass “rather in abstracto than in concreto.”37
The other expression of the relation between the ethical 
and the aesthetic, which equally emphasizes the concrete, is 
found in Judge William’s constantly repeated claim that the ethi­
cal “preserve[sj” and “transfigure[sj” the aesthete’s apprecia­
tion of the richness of the concrete. He realizes the value inhe­
rent in the aesthetic interest in particularity and distinctiveness
and difference, and insists that such value is not left behind, for 
it is the “whole aesthetical self which is chosen ethically.”38 The 
concreteness of the aesthetic retains its “validity” and is “pre­
served”39; indeed, its “transfiguration” means that the ethical 
has a deeper appreciation of the concrete, “one concrete 
expression the more, deeper than every aesthetic expression.”40
The feminist and/or ethical critic might argue that Judge 
William’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding he represents 
the ethical as an orientation to an abstract, generalized other in 
that, for example, however much he raves about the preserva­
tion of the aesthetic in the ethical, he never once refers to his 
wife by name. This is in stark contrast to the concrete identi­
fying which occurs in the papers of the aesthete where individu­
als have a particular name and are not treated as a general 
type.41 But that, I think, would be to be misled by a surface diffe­
rence, for although he does not present the details about the 
“other,” his wife, to the reader, he does give evidence of how 
important those details are to him, including the way her 
“small” nose “turns itself saucily to the world.”42 It is this kind 
of attentiveness to detail which is part of the “reverence” for the 
other without which, he insists, one cannot love; it is why he 
says love is not blind, but rather “is an absolute alertness, an 
absolute beholding.”43 When the individual “becomes conscious 
of himself as this definite individual, with these talents, these 
dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by these 
definite surroundings, as this definite product of a definite en­
vironment,”44 he is conscious of the definiteness of the other. To 
be “influenced by these definite surroundings” is to see choice 
as contextualized by the concreteness of the other to whom one 
is related.
Thirdly, Judge William explicitly distinguishes between two 
modes of being ethical in a way which is reminiscent of the dis­
cussion of the “general” vs. the “concrete” other. He refers to an 
orientation which is admittedly ethical even though in it “I de­
tach myself from the whole world till by this detachment I end 
in abstract identity.”45 “The imperfection of this life view,” he 
continues, lies “in the fact that this individual had chosen him­
self altogether abstractly,” whereas genuine ethical choice “puts 
the individual in the most intimate connection and the most 
exact cohesion with a surrounding world.”46 Such “intimate” 
and “exact” cohesion surely describes an orientation to con­
crete others.
Moreover, although Judge William refuses to investigate 
“the relation between the Aristotelian and the Kantian interpre­
tation of the ethical,” he nonetheless explicitly approves as 
“more perfect” the Aristotelian appeal to “the social sense” as 
contrasted with “the modern view which bases justice upon 
duty, the abstract categorical.”47 Reinforcing his claim that “an 
abstract calling is no calling,” he reiterates that duty is particu­
lar and the relation to duty should not be “abstract.”48
In keeping with these kinds of claims, Judge William’s 
understanding of the task of transforming oneself “into the uni­
versal man” is radically qualified by his insistence on the con­
crete and particular: a person, he says, “makes himself the uni­
versal man, not by divesting himself of his concretion ... but by 
clothing himself with it.”49 The task of becoming the univeral 
man is equivalently the universal task of “being this particular 
man who is yet at the same time the universal man,” for every 
one is both “the universal-human” and the “exception.”50
That “unity of universal and particular” which is at the 
heart of the ethical makes of duty a “dialectic”: “my duty is the 
particular, something for me alone, and yet it is duty and hence 
the universal.”51 The univeral exists, and only exists, in the part­
icular: “the universal exists nowhere as such, and it depends 
upon me, upon my energy of consciousness, whether in the 
particular I will see the universal or merely the particular.”52 
Seeing “the universal in the particular” is an imaginative activity 
- indeed, it has been called “the very central function of the 
imagination.”53 In claiming that it is as wrong-headed to see only 
the particular (as the aesthete does) as it is to see only the 
abstract universal, William is clearly arguing that the tension 
between them must be sustained - and only imagination can 
hold such opposites in tension. Such an understanding of the 
ethical use of imagination clearly seeks to avoid the pitfalls of 
an abstract, universalizable ethical orientation. Judge William’s 
claim, then, that the ideal is the “possession of the universal in 
the peculiarity” rather them the “universal in abstracto”54 echoes 
Benhabib’s feminist conclusion that the alternative to a “gene­
ralized other” orientation is one which “acknowledges that 
every generalized other is also a concrete other.”
Climacus’s account of ethical subjectivity is, if anything, 
even more forceful than Judge William’s in its emphasis on the 
concrete, the particular, the finite. “The real subject,” he writes, 
“is the ethically existing subject” - when we ask about existence
we “ask ethically.”55 Climacus here contrasts the ethical sphere 
of reality, actuality, and existence, with the “sphere of the possi­
ble.” Since, as we have seen, imagination is necessary to ethical 
choice, he is contrasting the engaged, concrete, use of imagina­
tion with the abstract, objective use. His strident condemnation 
of the “abstract” in the realm of existence echoes Judge 
William’s rejection - both imply the rejection of an orientation 
to a disembodied, disembedded, generalized other. Just as we 
cannot abstract our self from its concreteness, so we cannot ab­
stract others from their concreteness. What is true of the self in 
relation to its other (ideal) self is true also of the social other - 
in this respect they are echoes of each other.
The emphasis on the concrete, for Climacus, is a dual- 
edged one: the concrete is delimited and yet inexhaustible. The 
concrete has definition, as opposed to the infinite abstract, but 
its exploration is inexhaustible. The emphasis on the concrete, 
the finite, in his account of ethical subjectivity is clearly one 
involving an imaginative appropriation of the other who is as 
much a person to be explored as oneself. The emphasis on the 
“individual” is an affirmation of the individuated - in relation - 
rather them of the individualistic.
In sum, feminist theorists in general have rejected genderi- 
zed concepts of both rationality and morality which place a pre­
mium on abstraction. In his concern with ethical subjectivity 
Climacus rejects an abstract concept of rationality, and both he 
and Judge William reject an abstract concept of the ethical 
response. Although it is not always the case that “the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend,” in this case it does seem that Kierke­
gaard’s alignment of imagination with the feminine symbolizes 
an appreciation of ethical imagination congenial to feminist 
ethics.
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